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NEW MEASURES OF WORKFORCE SKILLS IN THE EU
Lili Kang, Mary O’Mahony and Fei Peng*
This paper presents new data series designed to yield a more complete picture of the growth in average skill levels 
embedded in the EU workforce, comparing with competitor countries such as the US and China. Harmonised data from 
EU surveys are employed to extend coverage in existing databases to more countries, to cover the period of the financial 
crisis, and to skills acquired through informal workforce training. The results indicate growth in labour quality in the EU15 
marginally below the US, convergence of the group of new member states to the EU15 but no sign of convergence of 
China to more developed regions. There is evidence of a pronounced rise in labour quality in most countries after 2007, 
consistent with theories of labour hoarding, but with some notable exceptions. Expanding the conventional measures of 
labour quality to include informal training leads to small but significant increases in the growth of human capital in some 
EU15 member states.
Keywords: Workforce skills; training; financial crisis
JEL classifications: I25, J24, O15 
1. Introduction
There is ample evidence in the economics literature that 
achieving sustained economic growth is intrinsically 
linked to human capital accumulation. Many key papers 
place human capital at the core of the growth process 
(e.g. Lucas, 1988; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Glaeser 
et al., 2004; Galor, 2004). Human capital stocks are built 
up through countries’ willingness to invest in educating 
their early age population who subsequently use the 
knowledge acquired in the workplace. The knowledge 
obtained through general schooling may be topped 
up through work experience and continuous training. 
Although estimates exist for human capital stocks for 
a few selected countries, in general the approach taken 
to estimate the impact of human capital on growth 
or productivity is to estimate flows of labour services 
from workers with different skill levels – this is the 
method adopted for the US in Jorgenson, Gollop and 
Fraumeni (1987) and in the EU KLEMS project for EU 
countries (see Timmer et al. 2011).1 These estimates do 
not adequately take account of additions to workforce 
skills from additional informal training – this aspect is 
addressed in O’Mahony (2012). 
The purpose of this paper is to present new estimates that 
draw from the previous literature but are more complete 
in their country coverage and extend to the period of the 
global financial crisis. The paper presents the results of 
work carried out for the INDICSER project,2 designed 
to yield a more complete picture of the growth in average 
skill levels embedded in the EU workforce than available 
to date. This employs harmonised data from EU surveys 
to extend coverage in EU KLEMS to more countries and 
to skills acquired through informal workforce training. 
The paper begins with a brief description of the 
methodology employed, drawing from O’Mahony and 
Timmer (2009) for measures of labour services and 
O’Mahony (2012) for measures of training. This is 
followed by a description of the data employed (section 
3) and the choices made in order to construct the human 
capital measures. Measures of labour quality growth 
based on education/certified qualifications are presented 
in section 4 for the EU and for two competitor countries, 
the US and China, with a focus on trends before and 
after the financial crisis. This section also discusses the 
contributions of individual EU economies to aggregate 
labour quality growth and estimates by broad sector. 
Section 5 presents an expanded measure of human 
capital that incorporates the contribution of workplace 
training; data restrictions mean that the results in this 
section are confined to EU countries and to the period 
up to 2007.   
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capital based on post education informal training differs 
from that outlined in the previous sub-section. This 
is because training of this nature is often paid for by 
firms and so the return comes largely through higher 
profitability rather than increases in the wages paid to 
those trained. In addition data on the increment to wages 
from training are not readily available. The methodology 
employed is set out in detail in O’Mahony (2012); this 
section sketches the approach adopted in that paper. 
The methodology employed draws from a recent 
literature focusing on unmeasured intangible investments 
as sources of growth. The pioneering work in this respect 
is by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005; 2009) who 
attempted to measure investments in intangible assets 
for the US. These authors defined a number of types 
of intangible investments including software, scientific 
and non-scientific R&D, brand equity and firm specific 
expenditures such as on-the-job training and managing 
organisational changes. Subsequent research produced 
estimates of intangible investments for other countries, 
e.g. Giorgio Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (2009) for 
the UK, Javala, Aulin-Amhavarra and Alanen (2007) 
for Finland, van Rooijen-Horsten, den Bergen and 
Tanriseven (2008) for the Netherlands, Fukao, Sumio, 
Tsutomu and Konomi (2009) for Japan and Jona-Lasinio, 
Iommi and Roth (2009) for EU countries. This literature 
treats training as an activity largely undertaken by firms 
who pay the direct costs of training programmes and 
indirect costs in terms of production output foregone. 
The issue then becomes one of separating human capital 
formation where returns go to workers from those 
where firms enjoy the benefits. If this can be achieved, 
then changes in human capital formation arising from 
activities of firms can be added to those measured using 
the ‘labour quality’ approach outlined in the previous 
section. 
Estimating investments in continuous training requires a 
monetary valuation of the number of hours of training 
received by workers. To achieve this, hours trained, 
calculated as numbers of workers trained times average 
duration of training, are multiplied by the average hourly 
cost of this training. Hence investments in continuous 
training in industry j and time period t are calculated 
by: 
  (3)
where TI = nominal expenditures on investments in 
training, HTR = total hours spent training per worker 
and C is the cost of an hour’s training. Since, in the 
data used here, average durations are reported for the 
2. Methodology
2.1 Estimating labour quality based on workforce 
composition
In this paper we employ the methodology employed in 
the EU KLEMS database, outlined in O’Mahony and 
Timmer (2009), to gauge cross-country variations in the 
extent of upskilling of the labour force. In EU KLEMS 
aggregate labour input is derived as a Törnqvist quantity 
index of individual labour types as follows: 
(1)
where ∆ ln ,Hl jt  indicates the growth of hours worked by 
labour type l and weights are given by the period average 
shares of each type in the value of labour compensation. 
Assuming that marginal revenues are equal to marginal 
costs, the weighting procedure ensures that inputs which 
have a higher price also have a larger influence in the 
input index. So for example a doubling of hours worked 
by a high skilled worker gets a bigger weight than a 
doubling of hours worked by a low skilled worker.  
In terms of labour inputs, it is useful to split the volume 
growth of labour input into the growth of hours worked 
and the changes in labour composition in terms of labour 
characteristics such as educational attainment. Let Hl,jt indicate 
the hours worked by labour type l in industry j at time t, and 
Hjt total hours worked by all types (summed over l) then we 
can decompose the change in labour input as follows:
  (2)
with wl jt,  the period-average share of labour type l in 
total labour costs in industry j. The first term on the 
right-hand side indicates the change in labour quality 
and the second term indicates the change in total hours 
worked.3 It can easily be seen that if proportions of each 
labour type in the labour force change, this will have 
an impact on the growth of labour input beyond any 
change in total hours worked. To estimate equation (2) 
we require information on both hours worked and wages 
by labour type. In the results below we concentrate on 
the skill dimension, dividing the labour force into three 
groups, high, medium and low skilled workers.
2.2 Informal workforce training
The methodology used to include measures of human 
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This suggests that use of a wage rather than GDP deflator 
tends to lead to lower growth in training capital while 
the 25 per cent depreciation rather than the 40 per cent 
employed in other studies (e.g. Corrado et al., 2009) 
leads to marginally higher growth. 
   
3. Data
3.1 Division of the workforce and wage bill shares by 
skill 
The primary data source for shares of hours worked by 
worker characteristic is the quarterly EU LFS harmonised 
microdata, available from Eurostat. In this paper we 
report results for data extracted for the period 2002 to 
2009, although for some countries data are available 
for earlier years.5 In terms of the division by skill 
group, we employ three groups using the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) designed 
by UNESCO. The three groups are High (ISCED 5+6, 
first and second stage of tertiary education), Medium 
(ISCED 3+4, upper secondary and post-secondary, 
non-tertiary education) and Low (ISCED 1+2, lower 
secondary and primary education). Estimates of hours 
worked for comparable skill groups in the US come from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
We use the number of employed persons6 to calculate the 
labour composition index for China. The China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook provides information on education 
levels for employed persons during 2002–9, which can 
be classified into three groups: High education (College, 
University, Graduate and Higher Level), Medium 
education (Senior Secondary school) and Low education 
(Junior Secondary School, Primary school and below). 
Proportions of the workforce in the three skill groups, 
averaged across the period 2002–9, are shown in 
Appendix table A1. This shows that in the EU24 about 
25 per cent of the workforce had high level qualifications, 
with the proportion in the EU15 group of countries a 
little higher (27 per cent) than the new member states 
(21 per cent). Over the same time period the comparable 
figures for the US were 49 per cent, so the EU appears 
to be a long way behind the US in terms of the high skill 
proportion of the workforce, despite the convergence 
among young age cohorts outlined in the paper by 
Barslund in this issue (Barslund, 2012). Workers with 
medium qualifications make up about 50 per cent of the 
workforce in the EU24, a little higher than in the US (47 
per cent). This skill group represents a higher proportion 
of the workforce in the EU9 countries (69 per cent) 
than in the EU15 (46 per cent) with a corresponding 
previous four weeks, this is converted to an annual basis, 
allowing for time lost due to holidays and other forms 
of absence. 
Hourly costs C will have two elements, the direct costs 
of training (costs of running courses or external fees) 
and the indirect or ‘opportunity’ costs of the production 
foregone due to time spent on training.  Time away from 
production is valued at the market wage, as in Jorgenson 
and Fraumeni (1992). In this analysis hourly costs were 
estimated as:
  (4)
where DR is the direct cost per hour trained, w  denotes 
average hourly wages and adj is an adjustment for the 
skill composition of those trained (which differs from 
the skill composition of the workforce). 
 
The methodology set out above can be employed 
to estimate annual nominal investments in informal 
training. However for these estimates to be useful in 
estimating the impact of human capital on growth, a few 
additional steps are required. First, as a consequence of 
the additional training received, those trained may receive 
some additional wages. As training is more concentrated 
in high skill individuals, to avoid double counting it is 
necessary to adjust for this before combining with the 
labour quality estimates. Since there is no information 
on the direct wage benefits of training, O’Mahony 
(2012) employed a proxy measure based on the extent 
to which training occurs during working time to divide 
out the part of training paid for by firms.  Thus equation 
(3) is replaced by 
 
   (5) 
where P is the proportion of training that occurred 
wholly or mainly during working hours.
Second, nominal investments need to be deflated to 
constant price series – average earnings was used as 
the deflator since the indirect cost element is measured 
by hourly wages. Finally, using the investment series 
to construct capital stocks requires a number of 
assumptions including the form of the depreciation 
function (assumed to be exponential), the depreciation 
rate (assumed to equal 25 per cent) and estimates of 
the starting stock (assumed equal to the reciprocal of 
the depreciation rate).4 A discussion of the sensitivity 
of the intangible training capital stock estimates to the 
underlying assumptions is given in O’Mahony (2012). 
C DR wadjjt jt jt= +
TI HTR C Pjt jt jt jt
* =
R20    natiOnal institute ecOnOMic review No. 220 aPril 2012
Appendix table A2 presents the returns to High and 
Medium skills (relative to Low skills) from Mincer 
wage regressions for countries where micro data were 
available in both EU SILC and EU SES in 2006. The 
results are reasonably close for most countries and 
show similar cross-country relative positions in the 
two surveys. Discrepancies tend to be larger for small 
countries, although they are also relatively large for the 
UK. However for the latter we use the earnings data from 
the UK LFS since annual microdata series are available. 
In general we opted to base the relative earnings by skill 
group on EU SES given its much larger sample size, 
interpolating between 2002 and 2006, and used EU 
SILC to update to 2008.7  Estimates were constructed 
for 1-digit industry groups but only the results for the 
total economy and broad sector are presented in this 
paper. As the 2009 wage data are classified according to 
NACE rev2, we opted to use 2008 relative wages also 
for 2009 to avoid breaks in the series. 
The CPS is again employed to derive earnings by skill 
group for the US so that for the US (as for the UK) the 
employment and earnings data come from a consistent 
source. In the case of China, we derive the average hourly 
wage rates for the three education levels of employed 
persons from the micro Chinese Health Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) 8 data in nine provinces (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and 
Guizhou) in 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009.  We consider 
urban and rural areas separately and then weight them 
by the urban–rural ratios of employed persons; the urban 
share increased from about 25 per cent in 2002 to nearly 
30 per cent in 2009.9 
3.2 Data for estimating training capital
The EU LFS quarterly microdata also provide the basic 
data on hours spent in informal training. This uses the 
variable COURATT in the survey which asks respondents 
“did you attend any courses, seminars, conferences or 
receive private lessons or instructions outside the regular 
education system in the past 4 weeks?”. Appendix table 
A3 shows the per cent of the workforce receiving training 
for the EU as a whole and by country. This shows a 
marked difference between the EU15, with 11.2 per cent 
receiving training, and the EU9, where only 3.4 per cent 
of the workforce received training. The variation by 
country is also very pronounced even within the EU15. 
Around 20 per cent or more workers receive training in 
the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, while in some 
small countries, such as Portugal and Ireland, the figure 
is 5 per cent or less. Similarly the new member states 
show large variation including a higher per cent trained 
smaller proportion (9 per cent) with low skills in the EU9 
relative to the EU15 (28 per cent). Over the same period 
the proportion of the workforce with low skills in the 
US had fallen to just under 5 per cent. In China, about 
7 per cent of the workforce had high level qualifications, 
13 per cent had medium qualifications, while workers 
with low qualifications make up about 80 per cent of the 
workforce.
These levels estimates are however sensitive to the matching 
of education/qualifications across countries. For example, 
high school graduation in the US (included in ISCED 3), 
is basically an attendance measure, whereas in many EU 
countries this group includes students who have attained 
higher qualifications through national exams. Also many 
of the low skilled workers in China are farmers and their 
families working in rural areas. Differences in industrial 
structure will therefore affect the comparison between 
China and more developed countries. The Chinese 
Health Nutrition Survey (CHNS) database suggests that 
in the non-farm labour force the proportions in high, 
medium and low skills are about 15, 39 and 46 per cent, 
respectively, averaged over the period 2000–9. Thus, even 
excluding farmers, the low skill proportion is still much 
greater than in the EU or US. Finally ISCED group 5 
includes university degrees of at least three years duration 
(ISCED 5A) but also some tertiary qualifications of shorter 
duration (ISCED 5B) which might be more comparable to 
medium qualifications in some countries – see Mason et 
al. (2012) for a discussion of the division of ISCED 5. 
This is especially important in comparing Europe with the 
US since two-year degrees are much more common in the 
US which, to some extent, accounts for its much higher 
high skill share. Given these difficulties, the estimates in 
the next section concentrate on labour quality change 
rather than levels. 
The EU LFS has earnings data only for a handful of 
countries and this information is not in any case available 
in the microdata. Two alternative harmonised databases 
are available which contain earnings information: the 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) 
and the Structural Earnings Survey (EU SES). EU SILC 
is a survey of individuals and is, at least in this sense, 
compatible with EU LFS but has a relatively small sample 
size (422,747 in 2008 compared to 5,495,461 in LFS). EU 
SILC is available annually from 2005–9. In contrast, EU 
SES has a much larger sample size (9,589,512 in 2006), but 
is a survey of firms, is only available for 2002 and 2006, 
and excludes small firms employing less than ten persons. 
Ideally we would use a combination of both sources to 
derive annual series but this is only feasible if they suggest 
similar relative wages by worker characteristic. 
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follow a countercyclical pattern. The underlying figures 
show a rise in the employment share of high skilled 
workers at the expense of the low skilled in the EU, with 
the medium share largely unaffected. In the US the rise in 
labour quality growth in the final two years is even more 
pronounced, with high skill employment shares rising 
at the expense of both medium and low skilled. China’s 
labour quality index increases sharply during 2007–9, 
which is due to the rising unemployment rates of low 
skilled workers after the financial crisis. The difference 
between the two time periods in China is higher than in 
the EU countries, but lower than in the US. 
Before examining the results for individual countries 
within the EU, it is useful to extend backwards for 
aggregate regions to examine how the increases in labour 
quality since 2007 compare to previous downturns. 
Figure 1 shows the long-term trends for the EU15, the US 
and China, employing similar data as for the estimates 
for more recent years; long time-series calculations are 
not feasible for the new member states.10 This illustrates 
both the catch-up of the EU15 to the US and the lack of 
significant progress in China. This figure also shows that 
there is no apparent upsurge in labour quality growth in 
the downturns in the early 1990s or in 2000–1. As the 
timing of recessions across the regions differs, it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly which years should be compared. 
For the EU15, growth in labour quality over the period 
1991–4 was lower than in the boom years 1984–90 and 
similarly there is a slight reduction in 2001–2 comparing 
1995–2000. The correlation between growth in labour 
quality and growth in real GDP across the entire time 
period since 1980 is slightly positive, although not 
significant. For this region, however, the expansion of 
higher education provision in the past three decades is 
likely to swamp any cyclical factors.  
In the US there is more evidence that labour quality 
growth follows a countercyclical pattern. The US 
witnessed a small increase in the growth of labour 
in Slovenia than many EU15 countries. Data are not 
available to construct comparable measures of training 
for the US and China.
The EU LFS also provides information on the duration of 
training (in hours) and the proportion of training wholly 
or mainly undertaken during normal working time. 
Information on hourly direct costs (DR) was taken from 
the Eurostat Continuous Vocational Training Surveys 
(CVTS) surveys, which were carried out in 1999 and 
2005.  The second term in the hourly costs equation is 
the indirect cost. This is set equal to the average wage but 
adjusted for the skill composition of those being trained. 
This recognises that, in the EU as a whole, and each 
individual country, on average training is concentrated 
more on those with higher skill levels and hence on 
those who receive higher wages (see further discussion 
of training by skill type below). 
4. Labour quality growth from general 
education
This section reports the estimates of labour quality 
growth arising from qualifications achieved through 
the general education system; estimates incorporating 
informal training are discussed in section 5. Estimates for 
the total economy are presented first for aggregate EU 
and compared with the US and China. This is followed 
by a discussion of within EU changes in labour quality 
by country and broad sector.
Table 1 shows the annual average per cent change in 
labour quality for the EU as a whole, the division between 
EU15 and EU9 and comparisons with the US and China. 
This shows estimates for the entire period 2002–9 and 
dividing into the years before and after the financial 
crisis. Over the entire period labour quality in the total 
EU grew by just under 0.5 per cent per annum, a little 
below that achieved in the US, although not significantly 
so. The growth rates for the new member states far 
exceed those for the aggregate EU15, suggesting some 
convergence of education levels in the workforce across 
the two regions. The growth in labour quality in China, 
by contrast, was relatively low in this period, reflecting 
its small share of workers in relatively high paid jobs 
and lack of any significant increase in skilled labour use, 
especially graduates. 
Of particular interest are the trends comparing the 
position up to 2007 with the years most affected by 
the financial crisis. In the EU, the US and China there 
has been a pronounced rise in labour quality after the 
financial crisis so that labour quality growth appears to 
Table 1. Growth in labour quality, 2002–9
 Growth in labour quality
 2002–9 2002–7 2007–9  Growth  
    2007–9 
    minus 2002–7 
EU24 0.48 0.42 0.63 0.21
EU15 0.47 0.41 0.63 0.22
EU9 0.83 0.79 0.93 0.14
US 0.53 0.39 0.87 0.48
China 0.12 0.04 0.33 0.29
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relatively low in Finland and Sweden and are negative 
in Denmark, where the share of the lowest skill group 
in employment was rising in the early years of the time 
period considered in this paper. In addition the extent 
of the difference between the two time periods varies by 
country. Greece and Italy and the Netherlands have lower 
growth post 2007, with Sweden also showing a small 
dip.  However, most countries show similar pronounced 
increases in labour quality growth after the onset of the 
financial crisis; this is especially the case for the larger 
countries. In the EU9, Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia show 
a reduction in the growth of labour quality after 2007. 
The remaining six countries experienced accelerations, 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia showing 
pronounced increases in the growth in labour quality 
since the financial crisis. 
Figures 2a and 2b show the contributions of individual 
countries to labour quality growth, in the EU15 and 
EU9, respectively. This is calculated by multiplying 
growth in labour quality in each country by their 
shares in their respective aggregates (EU15 or EU9) 
labour compensation. These clearly show that the 
larger countries in the EU15, unsurprisingly, had the 
highest contributions from 2002–7. However, whereas 
quality comparing the downturn in 1990–91 with its 
boom period from 1983 to 1989, from 0.79 per cent 
to 0.86 per cent. The acceleration in the recession 
years 2000–2, compared with the period 1992–2000, 
is proportionally greater (growth in labour quality rose 
from 0.31 per cent to 0.51 per cent), but far less than 
experienced during the 2008–9 downturn.  In the US 
there is a negative correlation, equal to –0.27, between 
the growth in real GDP and the growth in labour quality 
over the entire period. 
It is difficult to pinpoint downturns in China, given 
very high growth in Chinese GDP since the freeing up 
of markets from the late 1970s. The comparisons with 
other countries/regions in table 1 are affected by the very 
high share of unskilled workers mostly in rural areas. If 
we ignored the rural skill composition and instead used 
the proportions of workers by skill type from the CHNS 
survey, the growth in labour quality across the entire 
period would be about 0.27 per cent per annum, which 
remains a long way below that achieved by either the EU 
or the US.  Thus there is little evidence of convergence 
of the quality of the Chinese workforce to the levels 
enjoyed in the EU or the US.   
Turning now to variation within the EU, table 2 shows 
the estimates by country. Labour quality change over 
the entire period is highest in Luxembourg, followed 
by Slovenia, Poland and Ireland. The growth rates are 
 Growth in labour quality
 2002–9 2002–7 2007–9  Growth  
    2007–9 
    minus 2002–7 
Austria 0.31 0.10 0.83 0.73
Belgium 0.38 0.14 0.98 0.85
Denmark –0.11 –0.24 0.22 0.47
Finland 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.11
France 0.38 0.30 0.58 0.28
Germany 0.37 0.20 0.79 0.59
Greece 0.40 0.46 0.24 –0.22
Ireland 0.91 0.70 1.45 0.75
Italy 0.54 0.60 0.39 –0.21
Luxembourg 1.68 0.95 3.52 2.57
Netherlands 0.46 0.54 0.26 –0.28
Portugal 0.71 0.69 0.78 0.10
Spain 0.51 0.46 0.64 0.17
Sweden 0.25 0.26 0.23 –0.03
UK 0.46 0.37 0.69 0.33
Cyprus 0.43 0.49 0.28 –0.21
Czech Republic 0.41 0.27 0.77 0.50
Estonia 0.24 0.12 0.52 0.39
Hungary 0.86 0.71 1.24 0.53
Latvia 0.74 0.17 2.16 1.99
Lithuania 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.04
Poland 1.13 1.19 0.99 –0.20
Slovakia 0.46 0.42 0.54 0.12
Slovenia 1.20 1.36 0.80 –0.56
Table 2. Growth in labour quality, 2002–9, EU countries
Figure 1. Long-term trends in labour quality: EU15, the US 
and China, 1995=1
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Poland accounts for less than one half, compensated by 
increased contributions from the Czech Republic and 
Hungary.
In summary, these new measures of labour quality 
growth allow us for the first time to compare the EU 
with countries such as the US and China. They suggest 
some convergence across regions and similar responses 
to the current downturn, with labour quality growing 
during the recession. These results are consistent with 
the vast literature on procyclical productivity and skilled 
labour arising from Walter Oi’s seminal paper that treats 
labour as a quasi-fixed factor with costs associated with 
hiring and firing (Oi, 1962).  Nevertheless the increases 
in the period of the financial crisis appear unusually 
large, although this might be due to the severity of the 
downturn. More puzzling is the deceleration in labour 
quality growth in some countries, notably Greece, Italy 
and Poland. This might reflect the difficulties firms may 
face in paying for the costs of holding on to high skilled 
workers but might also be due to reductions of relatively 
high skilled and high paid workers in the public sector. 
An analysis by industry might shed some light on this. 
Table 3 presents labour quality growth divided into 
three broad sectors: production industries (agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, utilities and construction- NACE 
Rev. 1, A–F), market services (distribution, hospitality, 
transport, communications, financial, business and 
personal services – NACE Rev. 1, G–K, O) and non-
market services (public administration, health and social 
services and education – NACE Rev. 1, L–N). Data 
constraints prevented a similar division for the US and 
China. 
In the EU as a whole, all three sectors show increases 
in labour quality growth since 2007 with the increase 
proportionally greater in market services than in 
production or non-market services. A similar pattern 
is apparent in the EU15 group but the acceleration in 
labour quality growth in the EU9 is higher in production 
than market services, with no change in the non-market 
services. 
The results by country are very mixed. Taking first the 
EU15 countries, seven of these countries show a reduction 
in labour quality growth since 2007 in production 
industries; this includes large countries such as France, 
Spain and the UK that experienced accelerations for 
the total economy. In contrast the acceleration in 
labour quality growth was pronounced in Germany in 
production industries. Only Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain experienced reductions in labour quality post 2007 
Germany, and to a lesser extent France, increased their 
contributions post 2007, Italy showed a pronounced 
decrease and Spain and the UK showed a small decrease. 
Poland clearly dominates in the early period in the EU9 
region, accounting for almost two thirds of labour quality 
growth. In the period of the financial crisis, however, 
Figure 2a.  Country contributions to labour quality 
growth, EU15, 2002–7 and 2007–9, percentage points
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Figure 2b.  Country contributions to labour quality 
growth, EU9, 2002–7 and 2007–9, percentage points
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different types of labour following the upheaval following 
the financial crisis. Factors that might explain this are 
differences in the relative costs of hiring and firing as well 
as government budgetary constraints in the case of the 
non-market services. One factor that impacts on the costs 
of firing labour is the extent to which firms have invested 
in training of their workers. This naturally leads on to an 
examination of training provided by firms.   
5. Expanded measures of human capital
This section presents estimates of informal training for 
EU countries over the period 2002–7; the required data 
to extend to the period of the financial crisis are not 
yet available. Table 4 presents investments in continuous 
training as a share of value added, averaged across the 
years 2002–7 for EU aggregates and individual countries. 
In the EU15 investments in continuous training account 
for 1.3 per cent of GDP but the share of these investments 
in GDP is about one fourth the size in the new member 
states. The variation across countries is very large, 
even within each country grouping. Hence in the EU15 
training investment as a share of GDP is highest in the 
in market services and for many countries the acceleration 
was proportionately much larger in this sector than in 
production industries. In non-market sectors there is 
greater variation comparing before and after the crisis 
than in market sectors. Some countries, such as Portugal 
and Spain and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands, 
appear to be reducing the employment share of high 
skilled labour in absolute terms and some others, such 
as Italy and Finland, significantly reduced the extent to 
which they were employing high skilled workers in the 
public services. In contrast, many countries, especially 
France, Germany and the UK, accelerated the rate at 
which they were employing relatively more high skilled 
workers after the crisis.
In the EU9 group of countries there is more uniformity 
across sectors. In production industries Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia showed a deceleration in 
labour quality growth whereas other countries, such as 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, showed pronounced 
accelerations. Similarly, in both market and non-market 
services, decelerations occurred for Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, while again the Czech Republic and Hungary 
experienced accelerations. 
Returning to the three countries highlighted earlier as 
showing a large deceleration of labour quality growth, 
Greece, Italy and Poland, the industry analysis does not 
suggest a common explanation. Thus in the case of Italy 
the deceleration occurs in both market and non-market 
services with production industries showing increased use 
of high skill labour following the financial crisis. Greece 
in contrast shows almost no growth in labour quality 
after 2007 in production industries, compared to positive 
growth in the previous period, but a small increase in 
labour quality growth in the two services sectors. Poland 
shows a deceleration in all three sectors. 
The analysis of labour quality growth by industry 
comparing the periods before and after the financial 
crisis suggests a complex picture and one that needs a 
more thorough analysis to understand the labour market 
forces underlying the varying use of different types of 
workers across the two time periods. At best we can say 
that the results are suggestive of greater hoarding of high 
skill labour in services than in production industries but a 
reverse finding for countries more focused on production 
such as Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Italy. However there are a number of exceptions to this 
general conclusion.
This descriptive analysis highlights some interesting 
divergences both across country and sector in the use of 
 Production Market Non-market
  services services
 2002–7  2007–9 2002–7  2007–9 2002–7  2007–9
EU24 0.46 0.54 0.38 0.56 0.31 0.38
EU15 0.47 0.62 0.38 0.55 0.28 0.37
EU9 0.61 0.72 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.81
Austria 0.41 0.34  0.29 1.31  –0.57 0.29
Belgium 0.18 0.31  0.19 1.02  –0.04 1.58
Denmark –0.13 0.45  –0.53 0.11  –0.04 0.07
Finland 0.09 0.46  0.19 0.28  0.33 0.04
France 0.53 0.49  0.35 0.77 –0.02 0.35
Germany 0.13 1.01  0.19 0.72  0.18 0.69
Greece 0.23 0.02  0.28 0.31  0.26 0.30
Ireland 0.39 1.10  0.87 1.05  0.49 0.92
Italy 0.36 0.47  0.45 0.18  0.89 0.41
Luxembourg 0.34 2.82  1.26 3.04  0.34 2.91
Netherlands 0.56 0.03  0.54 0.47  0.52 –0.03
Portugal 0.06 0.18  1.19 1.58  0.61 0.21
Spain 3.01 2.14  0.45 0.26  0.26 –0.20
Sweden 0.26 0.12  0.35 0.39  0.27 –0.08
UK 0.26 0.11  0.27 0.77  0.07 0.56
Cyprus 0.04 0.12  0.54 0.12 0.46 0.31
Czech Rep. 0.19 0.58  0.33 1.10 0.32 0.58
Estonia 0.07 0.13  0.07 0.31  0.55 1.31
Hungary 0.59 1.53  0.93 1.01 0.57 0.71
Latvia 0.01 1.08  0.09 2.27  0.91 2.04
Lithuania 0.65 0.41  –1.05 –1.34  1.05 0.90
Poland 0.95 0.78  1.34 0.93  1.26 0.95
Slovakia 0.38 0.37  0.57 0.49  0.51 0.42
Slovenia 0.82 0.60  1.51 0.77  1.22 0.37
Table 3. Growth in labour quality, 2002–7 and 2007–9 by 
broad sector
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In order to compare with the numbers in the previous 
section we calculate growth in real intangible training 
capital. Defining total labour costs (T) as the sum of 
labour compensation from EU KLEMS (LC) and 
expenditure by firms on intangible training (TR), an 
expanded measure of growth in the human capital of 
the workforce is given by: 
 g
LC
T
g
TR
T
gHC LQ KTR= +  (6) 
where g denotes growth rates, LQ is labour quality from 
the previous section and KTR denotes training capital. 
Table 5 shows the labour quality growth rates from the 
previous section, the expanded human capital growth 
rates using (6) and the difference between these two 
measures. This shows that failure to take account of 
workplace training underestimates the growth in human 
capital in the EU15 and in many individual countries, 
especially the UK, France, Spain, The Netherlands 
and the Scandinavian countries. Overall the impact of 
including training is zero for the EU9 group and small 
for all individual countries within that group.
UK, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, 
and these shares are up to or more than ten times the 
shares in Italy, Greece and Portugal. The variation in 
training investments share of GDP across countries is 
less in the EU9 group of countries but is still eight times 
higher in Slovakia than in Hungary. Appendix table A4 
shows the training investment share of GDP by broad 
sector. Training is more pervasive in market services than 
in production sectors and highest of all in non-market 
services.
The underlying data show that training investments are 
considerably larger for high than low skilled workers. 
In 2007 the proportions of the workforce in each skill 
group who received training in the EU24 were 17, 8 and 
5 per cent for the high, medium and low skill groups, 
respectively, and similar patterns of greater training for 
the more skilled hold true for all individual countries 
(see the discussion in O’Mahony, 2012). The indirect 
costs based on hourly wages also increase with skill level. 
Together these suggest that, in all countries, firms’ prior 
investments in training raise the relative cost of firing the 
most highly skilled workers. Some of the countries that 
showed a deceleration in the growth in labour quality 
from 2007, notably Italy, Greece, Poland and Cyprus, 
have relatively small training investment to GDP ratios, 
consistent with the idea that the costs of firing workers 
with higher skills may be lower in these countries. Against 
this, training investments are relatively high also in the 
Netherlands and Sweden, which also experienced a 
deceleration of labour quality growth after the onset of 
the financial crisis. More work is needed to disentangle 
the impacts of training costs from other factors that affect 
the costs of labour hoarding. 
            Investments in training as a %  of GDP
EU 24 1.20   
EU15 1.29 EU9 0.29
Austria 0.69 Cyprus 0.28
Belgium 0.52 Czech Republic 0.32
Denmark 2.43 Estonia 0.47
Finland 2.35 Hungary 0.11
France 1.05 Latvia 0.38
Germany 0.74 Lithuania 0.56
Greece 0.07 Poland 0.25
Ireland 0.37 Slovakia 0.88
Italy 0.11 Slovenia 0.66
Luxembourg 0.80   
Netherlands 1.92   
Portugal 0.27   
Spain 0.99   
Sweden 1.96   
UK 2.94   
Table 4. Training investments, average 2002–7
 (1) (2) Difference
 Labour quality Expanded human (2)–(1)
 growth capital growth 
EU24 0.42 0.50 0.08
EU15 0.41 0.49 0.08
EU9 0.79 0.79 0.00
Austria 0.10 0.14 0.03
Belgium 0.14 0.16 0.02
Denmark –0.24 –0.08 0.16
Finland 0.18 0.30 0.12
France 0.30 0.42 0.11
Germany 0.20 0.25 0.05
Greece 0.46 0.47 0.01
Ireland 0.70 0.71 0.01
Italy 0.60 0.62 0.01
Luxembourg 0.95 1.02 0.07
Netherlands 0.54 0.77 0.23
Portugal 0.69 0.68 –0.01
Spain 0.46 0.64 0.18
Sweden 0.26 0.46 0.20
UK 0.37 0.74 0.37
Cyprus 0.49 0.53 0.04
Czech Republic 0.27 0.26 –0.01
Estonia 0.12 0.13 0.01
Hungary 0.71 0.71 0.00
Latvia 0.17 0.18 0.02
Lithuania 0.77 0.79 0.02
Poland 1.19 1.19 0.00
Slovakia 0.42 0.39 –0.03
Slovenia 1.36 1.42 0.06
Table 5. Average growth rates in human capital, 2002–7
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than the more commonly used  ‘labour quality’ in the growth 
accounting literature (see e.g. Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005), 
on the grounds that the more standard terminology has a 
normative connotation, difficult to justify when dividing the 
labour force according to demographic characteristics such as 
gender. However, in this paper we only report divisions by skill 
so we return to the standard usage. Note the data gathered as 
part of the INDICSER project also divides the workforce by 
gender and age but only the skill division is used in this paper.
4 The steady state starting stock.
5 EU LFS Microdata were not available for Malta for the time 
period considered in this paper.
6 Employed Persons refer to persons aged 16 and over who are 
engaged in gainful employment and thus receive remuneration 
payment or earn business income. This indicator reflects the 
actual utilisation of total labour force during a certain period 
of time and is often used for the research on China’s economic 
situation and national power.
7  EU SES microdata are not available for Denmark, Ireland and 
Slovenia so our estimates for these three countries are based 
solely on SILC. For Austria tabulations were acquired from 
Statistics Austria. German earnings are based on the German 
Socio-economic panel which underlies the German SILC.
8 For a detailed description of the CHNS data, see Kang (2012) 
and Kang and Peng (forthcoming).
9 The effect of education is significantly different between the 
urban and rural areas, which results in significant differences in 
the accumulation of human capital. The China statistics separate 
the urban/rural numbers of employed persons from 2002 to 
2009.
10 The EU15 estimates are extended backwards using the data for 
the EU15ex group of countries in EU KLEMS, which excludes 
some member states such as Ireland and Greece.
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  High Medium Low
EU24 25.7 49.0 25.3
EU15 26.5 45.6 27.9
EU9 21.2 69.4 9.4
Austria 18.3 64.5 17.2
Belgium 17.4 58.5 24.1
Denmark 31.5 46.9 21.6
Finland 35.7 46.3 18.0
France 29.3 44.6 26.1
Germany 26.2 58.5 15.3
Greece 25.4 39.9 34.7
Ireland 33.6 39.7 26.8
Italy 15.3 44.3 40.4
Luxembourg 27.8 42.7 29.5
Netherlands 29.8 43.8 26.4
Portugal 11.3 16.7 72.0
Spain 32.3 22.4 45.4
Sweden 29.6 54.6 15.8
UK 32 45.9 22.1
Cyprus 34.5 38.9 26.6
Czech Republic 14.8 79.1 6.1
Estonia 34.7 55.4 9.8
Hungary 21.2 65.1 13.7
Latvia 24.5 63 12.6
Lithuania 31.5 60.3 8.2
Poland 22 68.7 9.3
Slovakia 15.9 79.2 4.8
Slovenia 22.7 63.2 14.1
US 48.6 46.6 4.8
China 6.8 12.7 80.4
Table A1. Proportion of employment by skill level, 
average 2002–9
 High skill Medium skill
 EU SILC EU SES EU SILC EU SES
Belgium 0.357*** 0.478*** 0.132*** 0.141***
Finland 0.384*** 0.334*** 0.051 0.045***
Italy 0.616*** 0.665*** 0.298*** 0.239***
Luxembourg 0.789*** 0.682*** 0.354*** 0.226***
Netherlands 0.559*** 0.530*** 0.220*** 0.169***
Spain 0.525*** 0.483*** 0.248*** 0.201***
Sweden 0.260*** 0.307*** 0.078* 0.079***
UK 0.454*** 0.616*** 0.177*** 0.225***
Cyprus 0.604*** 0.685*** 0.233*** 0.220***
Czech Republic 0.788*** 0.708*** 0.316*** 0.219***
Estonia 0.734*** 0.557*** 0.311*** 0.138***
Hungary 0.870*** 0.884*** 0.274*** 0.223***
Lithuania 0.789*** 0.588*** 0.354*** 0.085***
Poland 0.964*** 0.886*** 0.285*** 0.268***
Slovakia 0.685*** 0.816*** 0.335*** 0.313***
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significant at 90%, 95% and 99%, 
respectively. All regressions results use a Mincer wage specification 
with controls for gender, age and marital status.  
Table A2. Returns to skill level, 2006
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EU 24 10.2   
EU 15 11.2 EU9 3.4
Austria  11.2 Cyprus  7.2
Belgium 7.2 Czech Republic 5.1
Denmark  24.0 Estonia  3.8
Finland  19.2 Hungary  1.9
France  8.3 Latvia   4.6
Germany  5.7 Lithuania   3.2
Greece 1.6 Poland   3.5
Ireland  5.0 Slovakia   4.4
Italy  3.7 Slovenia   10.8
Luxembourg  7.7   
Netherlands  10.5   
Portugal  1.5   
Spain  15.0   
Sweden  20.7   
United Kingdom  27.6   
Table A3. Per cent of the workforce receiving training in 
the previous four weeks, 2007
  Production Market Non-market 
   services
EU24 1.1 1.5 2.8
EU15 1.2 2.7 2.9
EU9 0.3 0.5 1.3
Austria  1.3 1.8 4.4
Belgium 0.8 0.7 1.5
Denmark  3.1 3.9 6.0
Finland  1.2 2.0 4.3
France  1.5 1.3 2.1
Germany  0.9 1.1 2.3
Greece 0.1 0.1 0.6
Ireland 0.2 0.6 1.6
Italy  0.2 0.2 0.9
Luxembourg 0.8 1.1 1.9
Netherlands  1.4 2.8 3.4
Portugal   0.2 0.3 0.8
Spain  0.9 1.1 2.8
Sweden  1.1 1.3 3.1
United Kingdom 3.1 4.1 7.1
Cyprus  0.4 0.6 1.7
Czech Republic  0.3 0.4 1.1
Estonia  0.2 0.6 2.2
Hungary  0.2 0.4 0.6
Latvia  0.4 0.8 2.9
Lithuania  0.1 0.4 1.4
Poland 0.2 0.3 1.4
Slovakia  0.3 0.8 1.1
Slovenia  1.1 1.3 3.1
Table A4. Investments in continuous training as a % of 
GDP, by broad sector, average 2002–7
